From Today’s Zaman:

Paying a surprise visit to Ankara on Friday, Moqtada al-Sadr, the head of an anti-US Iraqi Shiite movement, requested that Turkey play a bigger role in the Middle East to establish stability in the region.

Making his first public appearance in nearly two years, al-Sadr met with President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an in the Turkish capital and then traveled to ?stanbul on Saturday to meet with Shiite officials from inside and outside Iraq.

Why would Moqtada al-Sadr be visting Turkey of all places? Here’s a thought. Iran is not giving up on its Sadr experiment, and is still hoping to use him as conduit for influence in Iraq.

Why do I say that? Back in February 2006 (see my post on that), shortly after a visit to Tehran, al-Sadr went on little tour of states in Iraq’s neighborhood, a tour I surmised was blessed, if not arranged, by Iran. At the time, it seemed to me like an attempt to burnish al-Sadr’s credentials. Stand him up along side leaders in the region, and hope some of that prestige rubs off on him. And in turn, maybe that prestige would boost al-Sadr’s political power.

A year ago I did this post on what I thought Iran saw in al-Sadr. In short, Iran was/is trying to use his golden family name.

Lately, Turkey and Iran have been making notable efforts to bolster their relations. Trade deals, energy deals, diplomatic visits. In March, Turkey even offered to help “bridge differences” between Iran and the US.

So, I can’t help but think if Iran quietly asked Turkey to let the goon al-Sadr come for a visit, for the same purpose as the 2006 tour. Let al-Sadr be seen rubbing elbows with Iran’s new pals.  Perhaps a rehabilitation effort is underway to try and boost al-Sadr’s standing, which has taken a hit lately.

Marc Lynch writes that “Sadr also reportedly met with a large number of Sadrist officials and personalities.” Another tile that may hint at a larger mosaic depicting Iran still hoping to prevent its Shiite neighbor from straying too close to the West.

Weaponry so advanced that it spots the enemy and destroys it from nearly two miles above the battlefield made the difference in the fight for Sadr City last spring. Lesley Stahl’s report shows rare footage of the weaponry in action.

In the first part, I looked at the city of Kut, Iraq, and how its proximity to Iran amid the ongoing battles between Iraqi forces and the al-Sadr militias served as a reminder of Iran’s involvement in post-Saddam Iraq. In the second part, I took a closer look at Iran’s meddling in Iraq.

• Cutting the road to Kut, Part I
• Cutting the road to Kut, Part II

In this post, I’ll take a look at why Iran may have thought it could use Muqtada al-Sadr, and why some analysts have talked about the Mahdi Army as a Iraqi Hizballah.

Why al-Sadr? Iran already had ties to the Dawa and SCIRI parties. Iran could’ve focused on using these parties as a tool to influence events inside Iraq. In 2003, al-Sadr spoke out against Iran, forcefully. Leaders of Dawa and SCIRI had gone into exile in Iran during Saddam Hussein’s rule, as they filtered back, al-Sadr denounced them as tools of Iran. One of his spokesmen, Mohammed al-Fartousi, was quoted as saying “We need someone from inside who suffered with Iraqis and represents the people’s voice. We don’t want an Iranian state.” (ICG Report 9/9/2003)

Nevertheless, Iran began to make overtures to al-Sadr in 2003. As Kimberly Kagan writes in Iran’s Proxy War Against the United States and Iraq,

Tehran had a natural Shia proxy in the Badr Corps and SCIRI, but it hedged its bets from the beginning by backing Muqtada al-Sadr as well. Sadr visited Tehran in June 2003, and was apparently receiving funds from Iranian Grand Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri until October of that year when al-Haeri started to cut his ties to Sadr….

Hezbollah also established a long-term relationship with Sadr. Hezbollah apparently began trying to establish relations with Sadr in July 2003 and had succeeded by August. At the end of that month, according to a US intelligence report, “Hezbollah had established a ‘team of 30 to 40 operatives’ in Najaf in support of Moqtada Sadr’s Shia paramilitary group.” The report added that “Hezbollah was recruiting and training members of Sadr’s militia.”

The fact that Iran came to al-Sadr is key, because it shapes the rise of the Mahdi Army in Iraq and what followed from 2004 on as an extension of Iran’s will. So, once again, why al-Sadr?

I think the answer is first and foremost, because of al-Sadr’s golden name. The al-Sadrs had long been one of the preeminent clerical families in the Shia world. Gertrude Bell wrote in her diary for March 14 1920,

There is a group of these worthies in Kadimain, the holy city, eight miles from Baghdad, bitterly Pan-Islamic, anti-British… Chief among them are a family called Sadr, possibly more distinguished for religious learning than any other family in the whole Shiah world.

There are three al-Sadrs in particular who gave Muqtada the power Iran was after, for Muqtada himself is not a learned man, and is more of a thug than a charistmatic cleric.

The first was Musa al-Sadr, Muqtada’s distant cousin. Musa was Iranian, born in Qom in 1928. He studied in Najaf, the center of the Iraqi Shia universe, and went to Lebanon where he became a prominent leader. ( See Fouad Ajami’s wonderful book, The Vanished Imam.) The Amal Movement in Lebanon was the military wing of a movement Musa founded, and a breakaway faction of Amal would be a part of the creation of Hizballah. There was a struggle between Amal and Hizballah for control in Lebanon in the 1980s.

In 1978 though, Musa al-Sadr went to Lebanon to meet with officials in Qaddafi’s government. Musa disappeared, and was never seen again. It was widely believed Qaddafi had Musa murdered, but Qaddafi has always denied it. Musa became known as the “vanished Imam”, something that greatly resonated with Shiites because of the obvious similarity to the “Hidden Imam,” at the core of Twelver Shiism.

The second al-Sadr was Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, another cousin to Muqtada. Saddam had him executed in 1980. Ajami writes in The Vanished Imam (p. 25),

Then in April 1980, a revered figure of Shia Iraq, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, Sayyid Musa’s cousin and brother-in-law, a scholar of great prestige, was executed by Iraq’s ruler, Saddam Hussein. That, too, spilled into Shia Lebanon, feeding the Shia theme of embatteld righteousness and the revered aura of Musa al-Sadr. Shia history is at its core martyrology; the death by poisoning or in battle of righteous Imams and leaders at the hands of cruel usurpers. Saddam Hussein, a merciless ruler from the Sunni minority of Iraq, was an embodiment of cruel authority, and Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr, a literate man of sensitive temperament, as good a figure as the imagination could come up with for the role of martyr.

The third al-Sadr was Muqtada’s very own father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. His story is a long one, but in short, he became a powerful and influential leader in Iraq, working to build a base that could stand up to the Hussein regime. Patrick Cockburn writes in his brand new book (p. 80),

Mohammed Sadiq was extraordinarily successful in his mission, given his own slender resources and the power of the Iraqi state. Today it is his face one sees on posters pasted on the walls in the Shia areas in Iraq… He looks older than his years, his features dominated by his long, straggly, silver beard, which led to him being given the nickname “the White Lion.” In 1998 he began to wear a white shroud over his shoulders, a sign that he expected to be martyred. Observers did not have to be told who he thought would kill him.

And indeed, on February 19 1999, Mohammed Sadiq was returning home in Najaf with his two oldest sons and a driver. Another car came up alongside and raked the Sadrs’ vehicle with machine gun fire. The two sons and driver were killed immediately, Mohammed Sadiq died a short time later.

Muqtada, the fourth son of Mohammed Sadiq, and son-in-law of Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, is heir to this heritage of martyrdom. The high esteem in which these three al-Sadrs are held is the basis of Muqtada’s power. In short, Muqtada is trading on his family’s name. Sadr City, the troublesome area of Baghdad that is a base for the Mahdi Army, is named for Muqtada’s father, not Muqtada.

This power is what Iran hoped to control. Iran has helped its client goon along. In early 2006, Muqtada went to Tehran, and there pledged to defend Iran if Iran was attacked by the West. A month later, Muqtada went on a tour of the region, meeting with leaders. He even showed up at the Lebanon-Syria border offering to mediate between the two. Iran already had Syria as a client state, Iran didn’t need Muqtada. To me this tour was an attempt to build up Muqtada’s stature. Stand the goon up next to some leaders and hope some of that gravitas rubs off on him.

Yes, in part Muqtada was a case of Iran keeping its options open in Iraq, but judging from Iran’s subsequent actions, Iran was clearly hoping to build up a force that could mimic what Hizballah accomplished in Lebanon.

As Michael Ledeen states in his book The Iranian Time Bomb, Hizballah is arguably Iran’s greatest foreign policy accomplishment. It drove the US out of Lebanon, and it has continually fought Israel. Small wonder then that Iran might want to have a similarly effective force in Iraq, operating outside the control of the government, that Iran could use for its own ends.

Again, the creation of Hizballah is a topic too large to fit into this one post. An excellent resource though is Magnus Ranstorp’s book Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. Dr. Ranstorp describes the creation of Hizballah in some detail. One of the things he describes is the influence of radical clergy from Najaf on Hizballah. (The current leader of Hizballah, Nasrallah, studied in Najaf as well.) The Ayatollah Khomeini spent a number of years in exile, many of them Najaf, and during his time in exile he developed his idea of “rule by the clerics.”

Hizballah was created by Iranian Revolutionary Guard members, and from its birth shared the the goals of the Iranian Revolution. Hizballah are not hired guns, they are true believers. With Muqtada al-Sadr, Iran had a heritage rooted in Najaf, and Shiites that could be influenced to follow revolutionary ideals, not a new Iraqi government.

Gary Gambill wrote in a Middle East Intelligence Bulletin,

A third possible explanation is that Iranian support for Sadr is intended neither to derail the democratic process nor to cultivate an alternate Shiite political contender in the event of its failure, but to exert pressure on the Shiite political establishment. The refusal of most mainstream political and religious Shiite leaders to express unmitigated criticism of Sadr (in spite of their immense personal distaste for him) underscores how easily they can be intimidated by anyone who raises the banner of anti-Americanism. Iranian support for Sadr may be, above all, motivated by the desire to control if and when this banner is raised during the political transition process.

Muqtada was at odds with the Hawaz establishment in Najaf, led by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, from the beginning. Nimrod Raphaeli describes Muqtada’s willingness to shed blood in a Middle East Quarterly,

Muqtada’s rise to prominence came shortly after U.S. forces marched through the country. On April 3, 2003, as U.S., British, and Polish forces pushed through southern Iraq on the path to Baghdad, Hojjat ul-Islam Abdul Majid al-Khoei returned to Iraq. Less than two weeks later, he was dead, hacked to death with two of his supporters in the mosque of Imam ‘Ali, perhaps the holiest shrine in Shi‘ite Islam.[9]

The death of the 40-year-old Khoei reverberated around the world for he was the son of Grand Ayatollah Abulqasim Musawi al-Khoei, the Iranian-born architect of a prominent school of thought in the principles of jurisprudence and Islamic law. Abulqasim Musawi al-Khoei had also been the teacher of Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali al-Sistani, perhaps the most prominent living Shi‘ite religious scholar today. Abdul Majid was prominent in his own right, however. Following the failed Shi‘ite rebellion against Saddam in 1991 and the subsequent liquidation of many clerics, Abdul-Majid al-Khoei fled to London to head the Al-Khoei Foundation, a charitable organization active not only in southern Iraq but also across Africa and Asia. Many Shi‘ite and Iraq watchers considered Khoei both a religious moderate and a rising young star. Following Khoei’s assassination, supporters of Muqtada demonstrated outside the home of Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali al-Sistani, the most senior ayatollah in the Hawza, calling on him to go back to Iran. The siege ended only after Sistani called in 1,500 tribesmen from surrounding areas to disperse the crowd.

Khoei’s assassination removed from the Iraqi political and religious scene one of Muqtada al-Sadr’s chief competitors. Hawza officials put together the details of Khoei’s murder and named Muqtada al-Sadr’s supporters as responsible. They delivered their findings to a U.S. Marine Corps officer who passed a translated version up the chain of command, but the U.S. military took no action.[10] Had U.S. officials authorized the immediate detention of Muqtada al-Sadr for Khoei’s murder, they not only would have won the hearts and minds of the Shi‘ite establishment but also would have spared themselves a festering problem, made more lethal by the extra year of organization.

Shortly afterward, another prominent Shi‘ite figure was assassinated, again apparently at the hands of Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers. Assailants murdered Hayder ar-Rifa’i, the klaydar (keeper of the key) of the tomb of Imam ‘Ali.

Here is where the US made one of its biggest mistakes in Iraq. An arrest warrant was issued, for Sadr’s connection to Khoei’s murder, but Muqtada was never arrested. In 2004, Muqtada’s followers erupted, with intense violence spreading across southern Iraq. US forces eventually got a handle on things, but again, Muqtada was never apprehended. Iraq has been dealing with the consequences ever since.

Muqtada’s father built up a system of charitable systems to support the needy, similar to what Hizballah has done in Lebanon. This support system is a key part of Hizballah’s popularity. (A recent poll found that Nasrallah is the most popular leader in the Arab world.) This is another aspect of why Sadr was attractive to iran.

Andrew Exum had an article at The Washington Institute pointing out important differences between Hizballah and the Mahdi Army. These differences should not be ignored. However, as Coalition Forces, via the surge, began to get a handle on Al Qaeda and Sunni resistance, we are at point where US commanders now point to Iran, and the militias it backs, as the greatest threat to Iraq.

An important part of the surge, however, was a determined effort to go after these Iranian-backed networks and militias. The recent fighting in southern Iraq and Basra showed that the Mahdi Army is not strong enough to fight the US and improving Iraqi security forces toe to toe. It is by no means a given that Iran will succeed in creating an Iraqi Hizballah.

Regardless of the support given to Muqtada, the Arab-Persian divide is still very real, and being seen as a tool of Iran is not going to do Muqtada a lot of good in the long run. Muqtada has run to Iran for safety as US pressure increased, and his absence has been noticed.

A determined will on the part of US and Iraqi forces can still defeat the Mahdi Army, and we must keep in mind that we are fighting Iran in Iraq. The danger is that US elections in November will hand power to the Democratic Party, a party that has continually signalled its willingness to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Iran is pursuing a very Iranian strategy, that of using a proxy to achieve its goals. We cannot refuse to look past that proxy.

From Press TV,

The Mehran border crossing in western Iran has reportedly been reopened, allowing Iranians to travel to Iraq via pilgrim caravans.

“Improved security has allowed the reopening of the border to pilgrims wishing to visit the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf,” said Deputy Head of Iran’s Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization Hossein Akbari.

Iran suspended pilgrim tours to Muslim holy sites in Iraq last month due to the violence that followed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s security crackdown in Basra.

The article also helpfully adds,

The Mehran border crossing is an important crossing point for pilgrims into Iraq; it is also an export hub for Iranian commodities.

Indeed, but as discussed in this post, Mehran is also a hub for Iranian support coming into Iraq for the Special Groups.

Over at Pajamas Media, Austin Bay hosts a panel of bloggers talking about Iraq. His guests include Jules Crittenden, Michael Totten,  Bill Roggio and Glenn Reynolds.

There is a transcript there at the PM page. Here is audio of the interview.

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An excerpt:

MR. BAY: Michael Totten, Glenn Reynolds, any last thought?

MR. TOTTEN: I’ll just make one quick point. This is Michael. That everything we’ve tried in Iraq has failed up until this last year with General Petraeus’ new counter-insurgency strategy. And it seems to me that once we finally figured out something that actually works in this country that abandoning it now would be gratuitous for one thing because it’s working and also very destructive because if there’s future trouble down the line in Iraq that we have to get involved in, we’re not going to be able to just go and resume where General Petraeus left off. Whatever we’re going to do in Iraq, beyond this we’ve ended it and the place goes to hell like, say, Gaza did after the Israelis left. We’re likely going to be stuck in a hopeless situation with Iraq in sort of the way the Israelis are with the Palestinians. And this is hardly the time to quit. If the surge strategy fails then maybe we can make the argument that we’re just going to have to let it go anyway. But until that happens, it just seems really stupid.

MR. BAY: Glenn Reynolds?

MR. REYNOLDS: Well, I think that’s right. And I think that — you know, Ann Althouse’s comment on Ted Kennedy after the Petraeus testimony was a year ago you wanted to give up ‘cause we were losing and now you want to give up because we’re winning. There’s a common theme there. I think that it’s important to win. And my prediction for the coming year, which is something that I think Petraeus telegraphed a little bit in his testimony is to keep your eye on Iran. I think there is more going on with Iran under the surface than we’re hearing about and I think that’s likely to make the big news in the coming twelve months.

General David H. Petraeus, Commanding General, MNF- Iraq,and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Crocker testifed today before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. MNF-Iraq has links and transcripts of their testimony here.

I was curious to see what Petraeus would say about Iran, and here it is.

Though a Sadr standdown order resolved the situation to a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called Special Groups and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the Special Groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.
….
Various elements push Iraq’s ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminal gangs pose significant threats. Al Qaeda’s senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq’s challenges. Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports AQI. And Iran has fueled the violence  in a particularly damaging way, through its lethal support to the Special Groups.
….
Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on the Special Groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed by Iran’s Qods Force, with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq’s seat of government two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and Coalition actions in response. Iraqi and Coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmedinajad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities by the Qods Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq.

It’s a sign of how much progress has been made that Petraeus would say the Iranian-backed Special Groups, and not Al Qaeda, pose the greatest long-term threat to Iraqi security.

Tonight on PBS Frontline, at 8 pm Central,

“Here we are. It’s about 2:30 in the morning on the 2nd of October. We have been on the road for a while. … Wasn’t too excited to get this change of mission. The stretch of road between Anaconda and Speicher, known as IED Alley, it’s probably one of the worst stretches of road in theater.”
-Sfc. Toby Nunn, during his second Iraq deployment, to his personal mini-DV camera

FRONTLINE goes to war in Iraq with a band of California-based National Guard soldiers who call themselves the “Bad Voodoo Platoon” to tell their very personal story in Bad Voodoo’s War, airing Tuesday, April 1, 2008, at 9 P.M. ET (check local listings). To record their war, from private reflections to real-time footage of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the ground, director Deborah Scranton (The War Tapes) creates a “virtual embed,” supplying cameras to the soldiers of the Bad Voodoo Platoon and working with them to shape an intimate portrait that reveals the hard grind of their war. Says Scranton: “What compels me is telling a story from the inside out, to crawl inside their world with them to see what it looks like, feels like and smells like. It’s really important to give soldiers the chance to press their own record button on this war.”

Through their daily experiences, acting platoon leader Sgt. 1st Class Toby Nunn, originally from British Columbia and the father of three, and Spc. Jason Shaw, a 23-year-old from Texas, give us a firsthand look at the impact of the U.S. military’s policy of multiple deployments to Iraq and how the Army’s role has changed on the ground.

Blackfive has a review here. He writes,

Specialist Shaw is also featured. He was awarded the Silver Star for valor during the battle for Bagdhad. This is his third tour that he volunteered for. Shaw, after losing many good friends and seeing a lack of progress, has lost faith in his religion and faith in the possibility of success. It’s important to hear what he says.

And then there’s an old pal, Sergeant JP Borda, who started blogging when he was in Afghanistan a few years ago (when he was a Specialist). The National Guard Experience was a soldiers blog – lots of humor, comments, etc. Afterwords, JP starting Milblogging.com which was purchased by Military.com.

Sergeant Borda built the Bad Voodoo Platoon website here. And there’s more of JP in the video below describing the filming process.

Also, Jules Crittenden adds,

Experiences with Frontline’s war coverage have been spotty. I thought Frontline should be commended for taking a critical and very fair look at Haditha, rather than ignoring it like most of the war-bashers have now that the Iraq War’s defining atrocity has failed to live up to the hype. Last week, however, Frontline produced a first-class stinker.

In the first part, I looked at the city of Kut, Iraq, and how its proximity to Iran amid the ongoing battles between Iraqi forces and the al-Sadr militias served as a reminder of Iran’s involvement in post-Saddam Iraq.

• Cutting the road to Kut, Part I
• Cutting the road to Kut, Part III

In this post, I’ll take a closer look at that involvement.

According to an August 2005 article in TIME by Michael Ware, with the US next door in Afghanistan, and sending strong signals that it might go into Iraq, Iran was already planning a military presence in Iraq in September 2002. Forces were on the move by the following spring.

The Iranian penetration of Iraq was a long time in planning. On Sept. 9, 2002, with U.S. bases being readied in Kuwait, Supreme Leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei summoned his war council in Tehran. According to Iranian sources, the Supreme National Security Council concluded, “It is necessary to adopt an active policy in order to prevent long-term and short-term dangers to Iran.” Iran’s security services had supported the armed wings of several Iraqi groups they had sheltered in Iran from Saddam. Iranian intelligence sources say that the various groups were organized under the command of Brigadier General Qassim Sullaimani, an adviser to Khamenei on both Afghanistan and Iraq and a top officer in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Before the March 2003 invasion, military sources say, elements of up to 46 Iranian infantry and missile brigades moved to buttress the border. Positioned among them were units of the Badr Corps, formed in the 1980s as the armed wing of the Iraqi Shi’ite group known by its acronym SCIRI, now the most powerful party in Iraq. Divided into northern, central and southern axes, Badr’s mission was to pour into Iraq in the chaos of the invasion to seize towns and government offices, filling the vacuum left by the collapse of Saddam’s regime. As many as 12,000 armed men, along with Iranian intelligence officers, swarmed into Iraq.

Since 2005, the aforementioned General Sullaimani has been the head of the Qods Force, established in 1979 to export the Islamic Revolution outside Iran’s borders. In writing about Sullaimani at the Weekly Standard, Dan Darling said:

The very nature of General Suleimani’s position within the IRGC warrants him being on America’s radar. As the commander of Qods Force, Suleimani is charged with overseeing the IRGC’s extra-territorial operations and, according to Time magazine, he serves as a special advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the issues of both Iraq and Afghanistan. Under Suleimani–and his predecessor Ahmad Vahidi–Qods Force has been linked to nearly every instance of Iranian-backed terrorism over the course of the last decade, including the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, that killed 85 and injured 230.

It should be added that Qods Force also played a significant role in the creation of Hizballah. Suleimani’s role in the formation of the Iranian-backed militias, and his subsequent elevation to commander of Qods Force illustrates the importance Iran placed on these militias.

In the previous post, I pointed out Kut is near Mehran, Iran, which has been identified as a hub for the transportation of money and weapons. Writing in 2004 at Winds of Change, Dan Darling pointed to a lengthy November 2004 US News article on Iran’s involvement in Iraq, and this article noted that the MEK said the Qods force had moved some of its command staff from Tehran to Mehran.

According to the MEK’s operatives, both Badr and the Iranian command staff were based in Iran at the border town of Mehran. “In order to control and manage the intelligence and terrorist activities in Iraq,” a MEK intelligence officer wrote, “the Qods Force has recently moved part of its command staff from Tehran to the border city of Mehran.” His report also identifed the areas in western, northwestern, and southern Iran where Qods Force commanders operated, along with the identities of more than a dozen commanders.

At first, these militias formed death-squads, carried out assassinations, and probably attacked US forces. Ware wrote,

Intelligence sources claim that Brigadier General Sullaimani ordained in a meeting of his militia proxies in the spring of [2004] that “any move that would wear out the U.S. forces in Iraq should be done.”

In 2004, armor-piercing explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs) began to appear in Iraq. An August 2007 TIME article said,

Deadly EFPs have killed more than 200 troops in Iraq since May of 2004, the military says.

That same article also pointed out that beginning in 2004, militia members began to travel to Iran for training.

U.S. officials contend that Iraqi recruits from the Mahdi Army have traveled in groups numbering between 20 and 60 to Iran in a training program organized by the Quds Forces that dates back to 2004. Once inside Iran, U.S. officials say, Quds Force handlers transport recruits to training camps near Tehran. It’s there, allegedly, that Iraqi militia fighters hone skills needed to effectively use EFPs, mortars and rockets against targets in Iraq. Quds Force trainers, working at times apparently with experienced instructors from the Lebanese militia Hizballah, also school Iraqi guerrillas in intelligence techniques, sniper shooting and kidnapping operations before transporting them back across the border. Once inside Iraq again, militants who’ve undergone Iranian training reportedly form cells that U.S. officials now refer to as “special groups.” These cells, U.S. officials say, then continue to receive weapons, funds and direction from the Quds Force as they unleash some of the bloodiest violence American forces face.

I’ll pivot off this paragraph to point that the nature of Iran’s support for these militias began to change around 2005. In her must-read report from August of last year, Iran’s Proxy War against the US and the Iraqi Government, Kimberly Kagan pointed to the growing involvement of Hizballah.

The number and quality of special groups increased in 2005, as the Iranian government allowed Lebanese Hizballah to train Iraqi militias in Iran. The three small camps used for training Iraqi militias were, as of summer 2007, located near Tehran. Twenty to sixty Iraqis can be trained at once in these facilities, and the training courses lasted from four to six weeks.

The recruits were generally members of militias, including not exclusively Jaysh al-Mahdi. They crossed the border at Zurbatiya-Mehran, usually unarmed and in pairs, sometimes in buses.

On July 2 2007, MNF-Iraq spokesman Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner gave an extensive briefing laying out the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq. (The transcript of that briefing is here, the briefing slides are here.) Gen. Bergner said of Hizballah’s increased role that Yussef Hashim served as the organization’s Head of Special Operations in Iraq. In 2005, person in charge of the training effort was Ali Musa Daqduq. Bergner said,

Here’s what we learned about Ali Musa Daqduq:  He joined the Lebanese Hezbollah in 1983. He served in numerous leadership positions.  He commanded a Hezbollah special operations unit.  He coordinated protection of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.  And he led Hezbollah operations in large areas of Lebanon. In 2005, he was directed by senior Lebanese Hezbollah leadership to go to Iran and work with the Qods Force to train Iraqi extremists.

Also at this time, Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani was in charge of the EFP network, which as I mentioned had ramped up by 2004. However, Bergner detailed another important change around the 2005, 2006 timeframe.

In May of 2006, [Daqduq] traveled to Tehran with Yusef Hashim (sp), a fellow Lebanese Hezbollah and head of their operations in Iraq.  There they met with the commander and the deputy commander of the Iranian Qods Force special external operations.  He was directed by Iranian Qods Force to make trips in and out of Iraq and report on the training and operations of the Iraqi special groups.

In the year prior to his capture, Ali Musa Daqduq made four such trips to Iraq.  He monitored and reported on the training and arming of special groups in mortars and rockets, manufacturing and employment of improvised explosive devices, and kidnapping operations.  Most significantly, he was tasked to organize the special groups in ways that mirrored how Hezbollah was organized in Lebanon.

(click to enlarge) Ali Musa Daqduq, Hizballah liason with Iraqi Special Groups

As part of this reorganization, Qais Khazali became head of the special units in Iraq in June 2006. Khazali had had a falling out with Muqtada al-Sadr. Bergner again,

The Qods Force goal was to develop the Iraqi special groups into a network similar to the Lebanese Hezbollah.  Special groups would be unable to conduct their terrorist attacks in Iraq without Iranian- supplied weapons and other support.  Like Ali Musa Daqduq, Qais’ main contact was Hadji Youssef, the deputy commander for Qods Force Department of External Special Operations.  Funding and training of the special groups started in 2004.  The Qods Force supplies special groups with EFPs, machine guns, rockets, sniper rifles, rocket- propelled grenades and IEDs.

A November 2006 NY Times article by Michael Gordon and Dexter Filkins said this,

A senior American intelligence official said Monday that the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah had been training members of the Mahdi Army, the Iraqi Shiite militia led by Moktada al-Sadr. The official said that 1,000 to 2,000 fighters from the Mahdi Army and other Shiite militias had been trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon.

While most of the militants in these special groups were Iraqis, Iranians began to work inside Iraq. In December 2006, US Special Forces raided the compound of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the SCIRI, and two Iranians were captured there. Another five Iranians were captured in a raid in Irbil in January. One of those captured in Hakim’s compound was Mohsen Chirazi, the third-ranking member of the Qods Force.

In January 2007, a special groups operation raided a US facility in Karbala and killed five US soldiers. Writing at the time, Bill Roggio said,

On January 20th, a team of twelve men disguised as U.S. soldiers entered the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, where U.S. soldiers conducted a meeting with local officials, and attacked and killed five soldiers, and wounded another three. The initial reports indicated the five were killed in the Karbala JCC, however the U.S. military has reported that four of those killed were actually removed from the center, handcuffed, and murdered.

In his briefing, Bergner said,

When Qais was captured, we found an in-depth planning and lessons learned document.  It was about the attack the special groups coordinated against the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center on January 20th.  This 22-page document provides a unique window into the planning and execution of special group operations here in Iraq.

It’s important to point out that both Ali Musa Daqduq and Qais Khazali state that senior leadership within the Qods Force knew of and supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack that killed five coalition soldiers.  Ali Musa Daqduq contends that the Iraqi special groups could not have conducted this complex operation without the support and direction of the Qods Force.  Daqduq and Khazali both confirm that Qais Khazali authorized the operation, and Azhar al- Dulaimi, who we killed in an operation earlier this year, executed the operation.

The document that we captured showed the following.  It showed that the group that attacked the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala had conducted extensive preparation and drills prior to the attack.  Qods Force had developed detailed information regarding our soldiers’ activities, shift changes and fences, and this information was shared with the attackers.  They had American-looking uniforms, vehicles and identification cards that enabled the attackers to more    easily penetrate the Provincial Joint Coordination Center and achieve surprise.  (Inaudible) — reported that the captured soldiers were killed when the attackers’ dispersal from the site was interrupted.

As the Iranian-backed efforts against Coalition Forces escalated, so to (finally, some of us thought) did the US response. Beginning around November 2006, US officals began to be much more vocal about the Iranian presence in Iraq. In his January 10 2007 speech announcing the upcoming surge, (as Iraq was in grave danger of sliding into chaos), President Bush said,

Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of extremist challenges. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We’ll interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.

Indeed, throughout 2007, the US began a sustained effort to hurt these Iranian-back special groups. As you might have gleaned from the excerpts above, Qais Khazali was captured in Basra in March 2007. Daqduq was also captured in March 2007. The brother of al-Sheibani was captured in April 2007.

In the previous post, I mentioned a February 2007 briefing given by three unidentified US officials. The slides from that briefing are here, and that briefing also sought to lay out evidence of Iranian involvement. Several slides showed captured Iranian weapons. Here is one.

(click to enlarge) example of Iranian weapons captured in Iraq

They are too numerous to recount here, but there are many many MNF-Iraq press releases throughout 2007 describing operations and successes against the special groups. A commander killed or captured here, a financier there, militants here, and so on.

A significant part of the surge, and the operations that made up the whole, was aimed at these Iranian-backed cells. Kagan writes,

US and Iraqi forces have conducted a multi-phased campaign against secret cell supply networks. First, Special Forces captured or killed high-value targets, exploiting the intelligence gained from the capture of Ali Musa Daqduq and the Khazali brothers. They focused particularly on Sadr City, the base of special groups in Baghdad, and southern cities such as Amarah and Basra. As weapons trafficking networks linked Amarah and Baghdad, the operations in the south contributed directly to captures in the capital.

A second wave of operations against secret cells occurred in July, presumably as Coalition and Iraqi forces gained intelligence in the wake of Phantom Thunder. The scope of these raids widened, and included Diyala province and cities in the south.

Simulataneously, US and Iraqi forces intensified their campaign against secret cell leaders in Baghdad in late July and August, frequently operations against rogue milities in western Baghdad as well as Sadr City.

(The Institute for the Study of War has “this [Google Earth] file [which] maps Multi-National Force-Iraq press releases on activity by and against Special Groups. The press releases are plotted by the location of the incident in reverse chronological order. Efforts have been made to plot the data points with as much accuracy as possible.”)

The fight against Iran continues to this day. Allahpundit asks “What’s Maliki’s next move? Did Maliki’s government sell him out?” The Belmont Club looks at the twists and turns of the latest fighting against al-Sadr’s militias. Just today Jules Crittenden writes,

Persians magnanimous agree to call off their Shiite militias. I guess this means we don’t have to “alleged” or “U.S. accuses Iran of involvement” or any other qualifiers anymore. Apparently the mullahs are calling the shots. Iraqi lawmakers went to Qom over the weekend to ask an Iranian general to kindly stand down his murderous stooges.

In September 2007, Thomas Joscelyn published a must-read document entitle Iran’s Proxy War Against America, laying out the history of Iranian attacks on America. At the end, he said,

When confronted with evidence of Tehran’s support for anti-American violence, the reaction of America’s diplomatic establishment is to search for excuses. There is no better example than the recent debate concerning Iran’s support for the insurgency in Iraq. The media has reported for several years that Iran has supplied Iraqi insurgents with lethal IED (Improvised Explosive Device) technology. The IEDs are a leading cause of American and Iraqi civilian deaths in Iraq, and Iranian provenance for the weapons is a clear act of war.
….
America has long had a blind spot when it comes to her terrorist enemies. But the victims of their terror deserve better. America’s best, who have fallen in defense of her freedom, deserve better. It is long past the day when America should have dealt with Iran’s role in their murder.

Later this week, in the final post in this series, I’ll look at the person of Muqtada al-Sadr, why Iran thought it could use him in their efforts inside Iraq, and why some analysts have talked about these special groups as an Iraqi Hizballah.

Both Clinton and Obama have expressed their desire to reach waaaay down the gullet of victory and pull out defeat by pulling our troops out of Iraq. With lip service to the changes the surge has brought, they say the surge was really intended to give the Iraqi government room to meet the “benchmarks”, and since that’s not happening, they say, the surge has failed so let’s call it a day.

From USA Today,

Clinton — who voted to authorize the war, while Obama spoke against it as a state senator in Illinois — said “the so-called surge was designed to give the Iraqi government the space and time to make the tough decisions that only the Iraqis can make for themselves. … And I think that putting forward a very clear objective of beginning to withdraw our troops is the best way to get the Iraqis to take responsibility.”

Obama’s website,

The goal of the surge was to create space for Iraq’s political leaders to reach an agreement to end Iraq’s civil war. At great cost, our troops have helped reduce violence in some areas of Iraq, but even those reductions do not get us below the unsustainable levels of violence of mid-2006. Moreover, Iraq’s political leaders have made no progress in resolving the political differences at the heart of their civil war.

But has the Iraqi government failed to meet the “benchmarks”?

On Monday at an event at the AEI, military historian Fred Kagan released a report entitled Iraq: The Way Ahead – Phase IV Report. You can read it here. In Appendix B, Kagan takes a look at the benchmarks and progress Iraq has made on them. The table below is reproduced from Kagan’s.

I’ll just summarize the results here.

Does it look like Iraq is not making progress? Facts can be buggers sometimes, can’t they.

In the wake of intense fighting in Iraq between Iraqi security forces and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, I wanted to take a wider look at events. The current fighting across Iraq was sparked in no small part by the arrest of a prominent JAM commander named Firas Aswad in Kut, south of Baghdad, on March 9. Since then, as we’ll see, there has been deadly fighting for days in Kut, fighting that has spread to other cities, particularly Basra and Baghdad.

• Cutting the road to Kut, Part II
• Cutting the road to Kut, Part III

In this post, I’ll look at why Kut is important and what it might mean that the Iranian backed Sadr militas are rising up now, despite the fact al-Sadr extended his self-declared ceasefire for another six months on February 22. In the second post, I’ll look at Iran’s involvement in Iraq, and in the third post, I’ll look at why Iran has developed a relationship with al-Sadr and how the JAM is like an Iraqi Hizballah. As Michael Goldfarb writes at the Weekly Standard, “Who’s Behind the Violence in Iraq? The simple answer: Iran.” Iran has to be part of understanding what is going on in Iraq.

Kut is about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, on the Tigris River. As you can see in this image, the old part of the city is nestled in a sharp bend in the river, a defensible position given the style of warfare in centuries past.

(click to enlarge) the city of Kut on the Tigris, southeast of Baghdad

This bend played an important role during a famous siege in WWI. David Fromkin describes it in his phenomenal book, A Peace To End All Peace, pp. 200-203.

In 1914, the British brought a force from India to the Persian Gulf to protect oil supplies. This force soon occupied Basra. In 1915, Major-General Townshend was set upriver to skirmish with the Turkish Ottomans. Eventually, despite a long supply line in difficult terrain, Townshend was ordered to Baghdad. Near Baghdad, Townshend lost half his force and in November began a long retreat.

Fighting a running battle with tired troops, Townshend decided to stop in Kut, at this defensible bend in the river. The Turks moved in, and unable to dislodge Townshend, began a long siege. In April 1916, fighting disease as well as the Turks, Townshend’s forces ran out of food. British forces tried to break through, but to no avail. Townshend’s forces eventually surrendered, and few survived their captivity. Fromkin writes,

Townshend’s forces suffered more than 10,000 casualties between the start of their advance on Baghdad and their surrender. Twenty-three thousand casualties were suffered by the British forces seeking to rescue them from Kut; yet the garrison was carried off into captivity and found death along the way.

If you know me well, you know I think the “geo” in geopolitics is too often ignored. Even in this day and age of space travel and worldwide communications, geography can dictate so much.

The importance of Kut lies in its proximity the Iranian border. As you see in this image, it is near Mehran, Iran. Mehran is just over the border, nestled in a more fertile area. Kut is the first major stop on the road coming out of Mehran, and it is the logical route to bypass that harder terrain you see around Mehran.

(click to enlarge) Kut, Iraq and Mehran, Iran

As I said, we’ll deal with Iran’s involvement in Iraq in the next installment, but I wanted to point to a briefing we’ll come back to, one given in February 2007 by unidentified US military officials. This briefing laid out in detail how Iran was helping bring weapons into Iraq,  including powerful armor-piercing roadside bombs. The slides from that briefing are here. One slide, which I reproduce here, identified Mehran, Iran, as a hub for the transportation of money and weapons.

(click to enlarge) Mehran, Iran is a source of transportation for money and weapons into Iraq

If Iran supports the Mahdi Army, and if Mehran is a source of that support, and if Kut is near Mehran, it stands to reason that Kut will harbor a particularly strong Mahdi Army force.

And so, I’d like to offer up Kut as a metaphor for what is happening inside Iraq. If that road between Kut and Mehran can be “cut,” if Iran’s support for militants in Iraq who foment violence and discord can be cut, Iraq stands a much better chance of getting on its feet again.

The fighting in Kut since March 9 reflects this dynamic. I might add, as well, that the 2004 Mahdi Army uprising, led by al-Sadr, began with an offensive in Kut, among other places. US forces retook Kut on April 2004, after heavy fighting. Here is a brief summary of recent fighting in Kut.

• March 11 – Lt. Col. al-Amara says 14 were killed. US Special Forces killed several enemy fighters and destroyed a van suspected of transporting weapons and explosives
• March 12 – several rockets strike Kut
• March 13-14 – clashes in Kut leave dozens killed or wounded. Residents say Mahdi Army gunmen are everywhere.
• March 15 – Yaqen reports a policeman killed and several people wounded in fighting
• March 20 – Yaqen reports more gun battles, an Iraqi Lt Col is killed. Police have issued arrest warrants for 200 people. Police say at least 16 have been killed in previous 10 days.
• March 27 – Lt. Col. al-Amara says 44 have been killed so far. Al-Zaman reports in Arabic that the Mahdi Army has “taken over” Kut
• March 27 – A curfew was imposed on Baghdad and the cities of Hilla, Kut, Diwaniya, Simawa and Basra

US forces are quick to point out that the Iraqi security forces are taking the lead in this fighting. US elements are playing a supporting role. The Belmont Club adds,

The offensive is almost entirely an all-Iraqi show. British forces, though still in Basra are uninvolved. The International Herald Tribune says “U.S. forces also appeared to play little role in the clashes in Baghdad.” 

The fighting between Iraqi security forces and al-Sadr’s militias has spread to other cities across Iraq, with Basra experiencing the worst of it. At least 120 militia fighters have been killed and 240 wounded there. However, Allahpundit says Iraqi forces may be losing ground in Basra. (Jules Crittenden has links to more commentary on the current violence, as does the SWJ blog.)

An interesting dynamic in all this is al-Sadr himself. Where is he? Is in he in control of the Mahdi Army? He hasn’t been visible for awhile, and it has led to a drop in support among his Mahdi followers.

Richard Fernandez recently asked at Pajamas Media, “Where is Moqtada al-Sadr?” He writes,

Suddenly, having declared a ceasefire with U.S. forces in Iraq, Sadr vanished from the scene, having left for Iran. His ostensible purpose: to study theology. Amir Taheri described the life of what was certainly Qom’s most unusual theological student in early February, 2008.
…
The object of Sadr’s sanctification was to upgrade him from a militia leader into a respectable political figure, something Taheri calls the “Iranian project.” In order to do that, Sadr needed to burnish the theological and intellectual credentials he sorely lacks until he is ready to mount a challenge for the moral paramountcy of Shiism in Iraq.
…
It was as near as he could go to throwing in the towel while still remaining an active political figure. As if to underscore the extent of Sadr’s self-confessed failure, negotiations for a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq began even as he sadly told his followers: “many persons who are close to me have split for materialistic reasons or for wanting to be independent, and this was one of the reasons behind my absence. Yet I still have many people loyal and faithful to me and I advise them to direct society toward education and teaching.”

Sadr’s admission was devastating to analysts who claimed Sadr’s ceasefire was really responsible for the decline in violence accompanying the Surge.

I’ll have more about this relationship between al-Sadr and Iran in Part III, but an al-Sadr statement on Tuesday raises the question of Iran’s involvement. The statement said,

Iraq’s radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on Tuesday threatened a countrywide campaign of civil revolt as security forces battled his militiamen in the southern city of Basra.

Sadr, in a statement read by his representative Hazam al-Aaraji in the holy city of Najaf, warned he would launch protests and a nationwide strike if attacks against members of his movement are not halted.

“If the government does not respect these demands, the second step will be general civil disobedience in Baghdad and the Iraqi provinces.”

It’s difficult to see Iran allowing al-Sadr to make such statements while he’s on Iranian soil, unless Iran approves of the chaos the Mahdi Army is spreading. I wonder if Iran is turning up a dial somewhere.

Bill Roggio also highlighted al-Sadr’s admission of failure,

The clashes with the Mahdi Army come just weeks after Muqtada al Sadr admitted failure in Iraq. “So far I did not succeed either to liberate Iraq or make it an Islamic society — whether because of my own inability or the inability of society, only God knows,” Sadr wrote to his followers. “The continued presence of the occupiers, on the one hand, and the disobedience of many on the other, pushed me to isolate myself in protest. I gave society a big proportion of my life. Even my body became weaker, I got more sicknesses.”

On Thursday, an al-Sadr spokesman released a statement saying al-Sadr remained committed to a cease-fire that he imposed on his militia last August. One wonders how true that is though, with his forces in open warfare across Iraq. In Baghdad, the American Green Zone has been attacked for several days straight.

Al-Sadr may be trying to regain some influence over his supporters. Though, I don’t know which is more worrisome,  al-Sadr not in control of an increasingly dangerous situation, or al-Sadr fully in charge and at the controls of his army.

In the next post, I’ll look back at Iran’s malevolent intervention in Iraq and what Iran may be trying to accomplish. In the third post, I’ll look at al-Sadr himself, and why he is someone Iran thought they could use for their purposes.