The Afghanistan Study Group Report was released last week. Some key graphs from the 48-page doc:

The mission to stabilize Afghanistan is faltering. Following the rapid successes in toppling the Taliban government, passing a new constitution, and electing a president and parliament, the long road to reconstruction, reconciliation, and institutional  development has grown hazardous. Despite a significant increase in the number of foreign troops and the amount of aid to Afghanistan since 2002, violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its international partners falls. The year 2007 has been the deadliest for American and international troops in Afghanistan since U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001. As we struggle to build an Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, suicide attacks against Afghan security forces have also surged.
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The battlefield strength of the coalition forces has forced the Taliban to rely increasingly on smallscale attacks by bands of  insurgents and suicide bombings of soft targets that instill a sense of insecurity in the population. The Taliban is waging a traditional insurgency campaign. The Taliban’s guerilla tactics have slowed work on reconstruction and humanitarian projects. The coalition has proved it can clear areas held by the Taliban, but often sees these areas fall back to Taliban influence as soon as the coalition forces depart. A November 25, 2007 Washington Post article about contrasting views within the U.S. government over progress in Afghanistan described the mixed security picture this way: “While the [U.S.] military finds success in a virtually unbroken line of tactical achievements, [U.S.] intelligence officials worry about a looming strategic failure.”
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Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. With a per capita gross domestic product of only $377 dollars in 2007, most Afghans live on less than a dollar a day, the World Bank measure of absolute poverty. Afghanistan was ranked the second lowest country in the world on the UNDP 2007-08 human development index, and is in the bottom five countries of the world for life expectancy (42.9 years), under-five infant mortality (257 per 1,000 live births), maternal mortality, and adult literacy (28%). Access to clean water and heath services is extremely limited. In short, most Afghans remain desperately poor.
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To reach the international goal of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan, Kabul needs to have better and more reliable relations with its neighbors and the major states of Asia (Russia, India, and China). Achieving this calls for a much more comprehensive and sustained diplomatic effort to engage all the regional players.

Clearly, Afghanistan faces some challenges. Canada is making noises about the possibility of withdrawing its troops. NATO is reluctant to increase troop levels, and Afghan President Karzai rejected Lord Ashdown for the new role of international coordinator. As Jules Crittenden points out, there is cause for hope, though.

Contrary to Jenkins’ claim, the combat troops in Afghanistan have been taking the fight to the enemy. Overlooked by Jenkins is the inconvenient truth that the Taliban is getting its butt kicked; is despised by the locals in the areas it controls, as was seen in the fall of Musa Qala; and as with al-Qaeda, the Taliban’s “successes” are largely limited to the mass slaughter of civilians by suicide bomb.  As the AP was unable to avoid mentioning when it bemoaned the violence of 2007, of an estimated 6,000 Afghans killed in the Taliban’s year of resurgence, about 5,000 were Taliban and most of the rest were innocents killed by Taliban terrorism.  Jenkins also makes no mention of reports that the Afghan Army is growing in its numbers and effectiveness, or that Afghans, in those places where security has allowed development, are enthusiastic about the roads, schools and clinics that dramatically improve their lives.

The report is right to point out the difficulties posed by poverty, narcotics, lack of infrastructure guerillas in the midst, etc… The report is also correct to recognize Iran could be part of the solution. One thing I think the report gets wrong, however, is a failure to assess Iran’s willingness to be part of the solution.

In addition to promoting and assisting these steps with Pakistan, the U.S. should develop a strategy toward Iran that includes the possibility to resume discussions with Iran to coax greater cooperation from Tehran in helping to stabilize Afghanistan, beginning with the issue of counter-narcotics, where common ground already exists between Iran and the international community…. Washington, with its allies, should develop a comprehensive picture of what Iran is doing in Afghanistan and map out a sound strategy that seeks to convince Tehran to develop a more constructive role there, including the possibility to reestablish direct talks on Afghanistan. The present U.S stance of not speaking with Tehran about Afghanistan risks increasing the likelihood that Iran will step up its covert interference as a way of hurting the United States.

The Iraq Study Group proposed much the same thing. If Iran perceives there will be no consequences to thwarting American interests in Afghanistan, or Iraq, what motivation would it possibly have help the US?