In the wake of intense fighting in Iraq between Iraqi security forces and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, I wanted to take a wider look at events. The current fighting across Iraq was sparked in no small part by the arrest of a prominent JAM commander named Firas Aswad in Kut, south of Baghdad, on March 9. Since then, as we’ll see, there has been deadly fighting for days in Kut, fighting that has spread to other cities, particularly Basra and Baghdad.

• Cutting the road to Kut, Part II
• Cutting the road to Kut, Part III

In this post, I’ll look at why Kut is important and what it might mean that the Iranian backed Sadr militas are rising up now, despite the fact al-Sadr extended his self-declared ceasefire for another six months on February 22. In the second post, I’ll look at Iran’s involvement in Iraq, and in the third post, I’ll look at why Iran has developed a relationship with al-Sadr and how the JAM is like an Iraqi Hizballah. As Michael Goldfarb writes at the Weekly Standard, “Who’s Behind the Violence in Iraq? The simple answer: Iran.” Iran has to be part of understanding what is going on in Iraq.

Kut is about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, on the Tigris River. As you can see in this image, the old part of the city is nestled in a sharp bend in the river, a defensible position given the style of warfare in centuries past.

(click to enlarge) the city of Kut on the Tigris, southeast of Baghdad

This bend played an important role during a famous siege in WWI. David Fromkin describes it in his phenomenal book, A Peace To End All Peace, pp. 200-203.

In 1914, the British brought a force from India to the Persian Gulf to protect oil supplies. This force soon occupied Basra. In 1915, Major-General Townshend was set upriver to skirmish with the Turkish Ottomans. Eventually, despite a long supply line in difficult terrain, Townshend was ordered to Baghdad. Near Baghdad, Townshend lost half his force and in November began a long retreat.

Fighting a running battle with tired troops, Townshend decided to stop in Kut, at this defensible bend in the river. The Turks moved in, and unable to dislodge Townshend, began a long siege. In April 1916, fighting disease as well as the Turks, Townshend’s forces ran out of food. British forces tried to break through, but to no avail. Townshend’s forces eventually surrendered, and few survived their captivity. Fromkin writes,

Townshend’s forces suffered more than 10,000 casualties between the start of their advance on Baghdad and their surrender. Twenty-three thousand casualties were suffered by the British forces seeking to rescue them from Kut; yet the garrison was carried off into captivity and found death along the way.

If you know me well, you know I think the “geo” in geopolitics is too often ignored. Even in this day and age of space travel and worldwide communications, geography can dictate so much.

The importance of Kut lies in its proximity the Iranian border. As you see in this image, it is near Mehran, Iran. Mehran is just over the border, nestled in a more fertile area. Kut is the first major stop on the road coming out of Mehran, and it is the logical route to bypass that harder terrain you see around Mehran.

(click to enlarge) Kut, Iraq and Mehran, Iran

As I said, we’ll deal with Iran’s involvement in Iraq in the next installment, but I wanted to point to a briefing we’ll come back to, one given in February 2007 by unidentified US military officials. This briefing laid out in detail how Iran was helping bring weapons into Iraq,  including powerful armor-piercing roadside bombs. The slides from that briefing are here. One slide, which I reproduce here, identified Mehran, Iran, as a hub for the transportation of money and weapons.

(click to enlarge) Mehran, Iran is a source of transportation for money and weapons into Iraq

If Iran supports the Mahdi Army, and if Mehran is a source of that support, and if Kut is near Mehran, it stands to reason that Kut will harbor a particularly strong Mahdi Army force.

And so, I’d like to offer up Kut as a metaphor for what is happening inside Iraq. If that road between Kut and Mehran can be “cut,” if Iran’s support for militants in Iraq who foment violence and discord can be cut, Iraq stands a much better chance of getting on its feet again.

The fighting in Kut since March 9 reflects this dynamic. I might add, as well, that the 2004 Mahdi Army uprising, led by al-Sadr, began with an offensive in Kut, among other places. US forces retook Kut on April 2004, after heavy fighting. Here is a brief summary of recent fighting in Kut.

• March 11 – Lt. Col. al-Amara says 14 were killed. US Special Forces killed several enemy fighters and destroyed a van suspected of transporting weapons and explosives
• March 12 – several rockets strike Kut
• March 13-14 – clashes in Kut leave dozens killed or wounded. Residents say Mahdi Army gunmen are everywhere.
• March 15 – Yaqen reports a policeman killed and several people wounded in fighting
• March 20 – Yaqen reports more gun battles, an Iraqi Lt Col is killed. Police have issued arrest warrants for 200 people. Police say at least 16 have been killed in previous 10 days.
• March 27 – Lt. Col. al-Amara says 44 have been killed so far. Al-Zaman reports in Arabic that the Mahdi Army has “taken over” Kut
• March 27 – A curfew was imposed on Baghdad and the cities of Hilla, Kut, Diwaniya, Simawa and Basra

US forces are quick to point out that the Iraqi security forces are taking the lead in this fighting. US elements are playing a supporting role. The Belmont Club adds,

The offensive is almost entirely an all-Iraqi show. British forces, though still in Basra are uninvolved. The International Herald Tribune says “U.S. forces also appeared to play little role in the clashes in Baghdad.” 

The fighting between Iraqi security forces and al-Sadr’s militias has spread to other cities across Iraq, with Basra experiencing the worst of it. At least 120 militia fighters have been killed and 240 wounded there. However, Allahpundit says Iraqi forces may be losing ground in Basra. (Jules Crittenden has links to more commentary on the current violence, as does the SWJ blog.)

An interesting dynamic in all this is al-Sadr himself. Where is he? Is in he in control of the Mahdi Army? He hasn’t been visible for awhile, and it has led to a drop in support among his Mahdi followers.

Richard Fernandez recently asked at Pajamas Media, “Where is Moqtada al-Sadr?” He writes,

Suddenly, having declared a ceasefire with U.S. forces in Iraq, Sadr vanished from the scene, having left for Iran. His ostensible purpose: to study theology. Amir Taheri described the life of what was certainly Qom’s most unusual theological student in early February, 2008.
…
The object of Sadr’s sanctification was to upgrade him from a militia leader into a respectable political figure, something Taheri calls the “Iranian project.” In order to do that, Sadr needed to burnish the theological and intellectual credentials he sorely lacks until he is ready to mount a challenge for the moral paramountcy of Shiism in Iraq.
…
It was as near as he could go to throwing in the towel while still remaining an active political figure. As if to underscore the extent of Sadr’s self-confessed failure, negotiations for a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq began even as he sadly told his followers: “many persons who are close to me have split for materialistic reasons or for wanting to be independent, and this was one of the reasons behind my absence. Yet I still have many people loyal and faithful to me and I advise them to direct society toward education and teaching.”

Sadr’s admission was devastating to analysts who claimed Sadr’s ceasefire was really responsible for the decline in violence accompanying the Surge.

I’ll have more about this relationship between al-Sadr and Iran in Part III, but an al-Sadr statement on Tuesday raises the question of Iran’s involvement. The statement said,

Iraq’s radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on Tuesday threatened a countrywide campaign of civil revolt as security forces battled his militiamen in the southern city of Basra.

Sadr, in a statement read by his representative Hazam al-Aaraji in the holy city of Najaf, warned he would launch protests and a nationwide strike if attacks against members of his movement are not halted.

“If the government does not respect these demands, the second step will be general civil disobedience in Baghdad and the Iraqi provinces.”

It’s difficult to see Iran allowing al-Sadr to make such statements while he’s on Iranian soil, unless Iran approves of the chaos the Mahdi Army is spreading. I wonder if Iran is turning up a dial somewhere.

Bill Roggio also highlighted al-Sadr’s admission of failure,

The clashes with the Mahdi Army come just weeks after Muqtada al Sadr admitted failure in Iraq. “So far I did not succeed either to liberate Iraq or make it an Islamic society — whether because of my own inability or the inability of society, only God knows,” Sadr wrote to his followers. “The continued presence of the occupiers, on the one hand, and the disobedience of many on the other, pushed me to isolate myself in protest. I gave society a big proportion of my life. Even my body became weaker, I got more sicknesses.”

On Thursday, an al-Sadr spokesman released a statement saying al-Sadr remained committed to a cease-fire that he imposed on his militia last August. One wonders how true that is though, with his forces in open warfare across Iraq. In Baghdad, the American Green Zone has been attacked for several days straight.

Al-Sadr may be trying to regain some influence over his supporters. Though, I don’t know which is more worrisome,  al-Sadr not in control of an increasingly dangerous situation, or al-Sadr fully in charge and at the controls of his army.

In the next post, I’ll look back at Iran’s malevolent intervention in Iraq and what Iran may be trying to accomplish. In the third post, I’ll look at al-Sadr himself, and why he is someone Iran thought they could use for their purposes.